LIABILITY OF SHIPPERS FOR ACCEPTING
REBATES UNDER THE SHIPPING
ACT OF 1916
The Shipping Act of 19161 provides that a common carrier engaged in

international shipping can be fined2 for granting a rebate of a portion of the
applicable charge under the rate schedule filed by the carrier as required by
the Act. 3 The question of whether a shipper 4 will be similarly liable for
accepting such a rebate, however, has not yet been fully resolved. The
statute is ambiguous in that the two provisions dealing specifically with
rebates are addressed to carriers only, while the section prohibiting rate
5
discrimination by shippers makes no explicit reference to rebates.
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) has recently initiated a
policy of strict enforcement with regard to the granting and accepting of

rebates in international shipping. In 1976, the FMC began an investigation
into what was thought to be a widespread practice by carriers of paying
illegal rebates on their cargo rates. 6 According to a Commission spokesman,

rebating intensifies when the domestic economy of the United States is
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 817(b)(3) (1970). These provisions of the Shipping Act contain
explicit statements of the carrier's liability for granting a rebate. See notes 36-40 infra and
accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Pan Am. Mail Line, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 728
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Maersk Line, 243 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
3. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(1) (1970). See notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
4. The term "shipper" is not expressly defined in the Shipping Act, but it is "commonly
understood to mean the owner or person for whose account the carriage of the goods is
undertaken." Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 497 F.2d 1053, 1056 (8th
Cir. 1974); accord, Compagnie Gdnrral Transatlantique v. American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663,
667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929). In most instances, the beneficial interest will be
owned by the legal title holder, but it may be granted to another, either by agreement or by
operation of law. 497 F.2d at 1057. See Note, The Bases and Range of FederalMaritime Law:
Indicia of Maritime Competence, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 187, 217 (1972). See notes 42-48
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of the omission from the
statute of the definition of this term.
5. Section 18(b)(3), 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3) (1970), prohibits any carrier from granting a
rebate. Carriers are forbidden to pay deferred rebates to any shipper by § 14, id. § 812. Both
provisions are addressed to carriers only. Discriminatory acts by a shipper are prohibited by §
16, 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). However, that provision merely prohibits the use of
any unjust or unfair device to obtain transportation at less than the rates otherwise applicable.
The statutory language does not expressly include the receipt of rebates by shippers within the
scope of the proscribed activity. See notes 36-40, 49 infra and accompanying text.
6. Ocean CarriersStudied by Maritime Agency for PossibleKickbacks, Wall St. J., July
19, 1976, at 3, col. 5.
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strong in relation to relatively stagnant foreign economies. 7 Since a strong
domestic economy results in a decrease in foreign demand for American
goods, carriers may be forced to travel overseas without full loads. In order
to increase cargo loads, carriers sometimes offer customers kickbacks
"under the table" or for deposit in foreign banks. 8 One shipper voluntarily
disclosed to the FMC that it had received rebates from various carriers in
order to determine whether the acceptance of rebates constituted a violation
of the Shipping Act giving rise to civil liability. 9 However, in that case the
corporation involved ceased its practice of accepting rebates voluntarily,
rather than in response to an enforcement action by the FMC. 10
I.

GRANTING AND ACCEPTING OF REBATES IN THE FIELD
OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

In January, 1977, Sea-Land Service, a subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds
Industries, Inc., agreed to pay a $4 million civil penalty in a settlement with
the FMC of charges involving illegal rebates to shippers, the largest settlement reached in the history of any transportation regulatory agency. 11 In
addition to the monetary penalty, Sea-Land agreed to pay the government all
of the proceeds it received from rebates and to set up new procedures to
12
prevent such violations from recurring.
At the time the Sea-Land settlement was announced, the Commission
indicated that enforcement actions against other carriers and shippers were
planned. 13 Several months later, a $340,000 civil penalty was paid by Sony
Corp. and its U.S. subsidiary in settlement of FMC charges that Sony had
received kickbacks from carriers. 14 The FMC plans to institute further
enforcement actions against both foreign and domestic shippers and carriers
suspected of participating in illegal rebating schemes. 15 The Commission is
currently investigating approximately eighteen foreign-flag carriers for pos7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Action IndustriesDisclosesRebates from Sea Carriers,Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1976, at 8,
col. 2. It was revealed that a Hong Kong subsidiary of Action Industries had accepted
approximately $390,000 in cash from carriers as rebates on freight charges. Id.
10. Id.
11. R.J.Reynolds Unit Settles for $4 Million in U.S. Rebate Case, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1977,

at 6, col. 2.
12. Id. A decision by the Justice IJepartment on the question of whether to prosecute SeaLand for conspiracy to violate the Shipping Act is now pending. More Ship Rebate Hearings
Are Urged, J. Com., Jan. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 7 at 3, col. 8. See note 17 infra and accompanying

text.
13. More Ship Rebate Hearings Are Urged, supra note 12.
14. Sony, U.S. Unit Settle with FederalAgency on Alleged Kickbacks, Wall St. J., Aug. 22,
1977, at 3, col. 3; Settlement Agreement Between Sony Corp. and Its Affiliate Sony Corp. of
America and the Federal Maritime Commission (August 18, 1977) (copy on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
15. R.J. Reynolds Unit Settles for $4 Million in U.S. Rebate Case, supra note 11, at 6, col.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1978:224

sible rebating violations. 16 In addition, the FMC has referred charges of
extensive illegal rebating by a foreign carrier to the Justice Department for
the institution of either civil or criminal proceedings. 17
N In addition to its stepped-up enforcement efforts, the FMC may soon be
equipped with more powerful enforcement tools. The House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries subcommittee is presently engaged in efforts to draft
new legislation that would impose more stringent sanctions upon shippers

and carriers involved in rebating in the foreign trades. 18 The pending bill 19
would empower the FMC to close United States ports to carriers defying
commission orders and would grant a limited form of amnesty or immunity
from prosecution to those carriers or shippers who volunteer information
20
with respect to illegal rebates and other Shipping Act offenses.

Thus far, the companies that have been subject to FMC investigations
have opted to pay their fines rather than resort to litigation. 2 1 Yet, when the
matter is eventually litigated, it is not at all certain that the Commission's

position favoring the liability under the Shipping Act of a
shipper who
accepts a rebate will prevail. Persuasive arguments have been made in
opposition to such a construction of the statute22 and these arguments are
16. Sea-LandRebating: To ProsecuteorNot, J. Com., Jan. 25, 1978, at 1, col 4, at 17, col.
7. The FMC' believes that foreign governments are shielding records of transactions involving
illegal rebating by foreign shipping lines. R.J. Reynolds Unit Settles for $4 Million in U.S.
Rebate Case, supra note 11, at 6, col. 2.
17. Justice Unit To Weigh Alleged IllegalRebates by Atlantica Ship Line, Wall St. J., June
1, 1977, at 4, col. 4.
The Justice Department may be asked to prosecute carriers for conspiring to violate the
anti-rebating statute. Conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States is expressly
forbidden by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). Richard Bank, the director of the State Department's Office of Maritime Affairs, has refused to give any assurance to foreign governments
that their carriers will not face criminal prosecution in the United States even if they comply
with FMC orders. Sea-Land Rebating: To Prosecute or Not, supra note 16 at 17, col. 7.
However, it should be noted that there have been no prosecutions of parties for conspiracy to
violate the Shipping Act by the Justice Department since 1972. Id.
There is some question as to whether the Jtstice Department has jurisdiction to prosecute
for conspiracy in view of the fact that the rebating provisions of the Shipping Act carry only
civil penalties, 46 U.S.C.. § 815 (Supp. V 1975); 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3) (1970), and the matter is
supposed to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FMC. More Ship Rebate HearingsAre
Urged, supra note 12, at 1, col. 1, at 7, col. 7. (position of Rep. Paul N. McCloskey, R. Calif.,
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee member).
18. Sea-Land Rebating: To Prosecuteor Not, supra note 16, at 1, col. 4, at 17, col. 7.
19. H.R. 9518, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H10877 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977).
20. More Ship Rebate Hearings Are Urged, supra note 12, at 1, col. 8. In view of the
proposed amnesty provision, companies have recently become reluctant to come forward with
information regarding illegal granting and receipt of rebates. There have been no further
voluntary admissions since early in 1977 when Sea-Land agreed to pay its settlement. SeaLand Rebating: To Prosecuteor Not, supra note 16, at 1, col. 5.
21. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
22. See United States v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 957, 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (restricting shipper liability for accepting rebates to cases where there was an
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supported by the lack of any explicit provision for shipper rebate liability.
However, the FMC's position would appear to be the most equitable, as
well as the construction most consistent with the perceived congressional
intent underlying the enactment of the Shipping Act.23
This Note will examine the legislative history and judicial opinions
interpreting the applicable provisions of the statute in an attempt to resolve
the ambiguity inherent in the statutory language. The possible resolution of
the matter by the FMC through the use of its power to issue rules and
regulations will also be considered. Finally, in view of the close parallel
between the Shipping Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, analogous
provisions of the latter statute also will be examined. The conclusion
reached is that in order for the Shipping Act's goal of uniformity of
treatment for all shippers and carriers to be realized, shippers must be held
strictly liable for accepting rate rebates.
II.

AMBIGUITY IN THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1916

The Constitution grants to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.' '24 It was pursuant to
this authority that Congress enacted the Shipping Act of 1916.25 The
Shipping Act is a pervasive regulatory scheme, vesting in the FMC an
extremely broad range of regulatory powers, particularly with regard to
shipping in foreign commerce. 26 The primary purpose of the Act is to
achieve uniformity of treatment among both carriers and shippers. 27 Conseattempt to conceal the rebate). See notes 61-63 infra and accompanying text. However, the
validity of such a restriction is open to question. See notes 61-69 infra and accompanying text.
Although one court expressed doubt as to whether the Shipping Act was applicable to
shippers under any circumstances, such-a conclusion has now been refuted. See notes 47-48
infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
25. Pub. L. No. 64-260, 39 Stat. 728 (1916). The constitutional basis is alluded to in H.R.
REP. No. 659, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1916). See also Compagnie G~ndrale Transatlantique v.
American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929).
26. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 336 F.2d 650, 658 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 383 U.S. 213 (1966). Included within the broad scope of the Shipping Act's
regulatory scheme are specific provisions dealing with deferred rebates and retaliation or
discrimination against any shipper. 336 F.2d at 658.
27. 336 F.2d at 662. The Senate Report states that "water carriers should be required to
charge equal rates to all shippers irrespective of the volume of freight offered for shipment." S.
REP. No. 689, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1916). One court has interpreted the legislative history
as follows:
The hearings and the Committee reports show that Congress was concerned both with
protection of carriers against unscrupulous shippers, and of honest shippers against
unscrupulous competitors, acting independently, or in collusion with a carrier.
We'conclude that, while Section 16 covers the situation where the carrier is
deceived or defrauded, it is not so limited.
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intended to limit competiquently, the statute contains numerous provisions
29

tion 28 by preventing rate discrimination.
The Shipping Act requires that common carriers by water engaged in
foreign commerce file tariffs with the FMC setting forth the one and only
rate to be charged and collected for transportation services on all established
routes. These records are to be kept open for public inspection. 30 Once the
tariff has been properly filed with the FMC by the carrier, the public is

deemed to have received constructive notice of all its terms and of all
applicable requirements imposed by the Shipping Act; 31 the tariff is then
binding upon both the carrier and the shipper with the force of law. 32 A
Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 381, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Therefore, a shipper may challenge a carrier's rates as being unreasonably high and contrary to
the public interest, while a competing carrier may challenge the rates as unreasonably low. The
distinction is of no consequence, because the Shipping Act of 1916 and the 1961 amendments
were designed to benefit both shippers and carriers. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt,
366 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
28. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 336 F.2d 650, 660 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd on
othergrounds, 383 U.S. 213 (1966). The purposes underlying the enactment of the Shipping Act
may be contrasted with those leading to the passage of the antitrust acts.
[Tihe congressional objectives in the passage of the Shipping Act were entirely
different from the objectives designed to be obtained through the antitrust acts. In the
case of the latter, the congressional purpose was, as has been so often noted, to
preserve, protect and enforce full and free competition. But the legislative history of
the Shipping Act discloses that Congress had in mind in that enactment a very
different objective due to the special problems of shipping lines in foreign trade which
called for a special and different mode of regulation than that provided by the antitrust
laws.
The Alexander Report which led to the enactment of the Shipping Act, discloses
that the object of the Act was to permit a controlled system of agreements designed to
limit competition.
336 F.2d at 660 (emphasis in original).
29. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 813a, 815, 816, 833a (1970). The statute's prohibitions
against discrimination may not be avoided through the use of individual contracts between
carriers and shippers. The power of Congress to regulate is said to include the right to control
the contract power of the carrier, to the extent that the public interest requires such limitation.
Thus, the provisions of the statute are read into the contract and become a part of it. Shippers
retain their freedom to contract with the carrier, but they are subject to the statutory rule that
prohibits discrimination. Compagnie G~n~rale Transatlantique v. American Tobacco Co., 31
F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929).
30. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(1) (1970). This provision was enacted by Congress in 1961 as an
extension of the filing requirement. Prior to that time, the statute merely required that common
carriers by water in interstate commerce establish, observe and enforce just and reasonable
rates. This requirement is still in effect. Maximum rates, fares and charges are to be filed with
the FMC and kept open to public inspection. Id. § 817(a). See also United States v. Stephen
Bros. Line, 384 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967). There is also a requirement that common carriers by
water file copies of all agreements with other such carriers that regulate transportation rates or
provide for special rates, privileges, or advantages, including any exclusive, preferential or
cooperative working arrangement. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
31. United States v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 340 F. Supp. 473, 478 (E.D. La. 1972),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 517 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1975).
32. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. 245 Packages of Guatambu Squares, More or
Less, 508 F.2d 1116, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1975). However, it has been noted that it is not the
establishment, publication or filing of an unlawful or unreasonable tariff that will afford
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policy of strict enforcement has been applied to the federally approved
tariffs, and the specified rate must be charged and paid even in cases of
33
mistake and without regard to a contrary intention by the parties involved.
The courts have recognized that such a strict interpretation may have quite
harsh results, and may even require decisions contrary to well established
principles of equity. However, the strict interpretation is considered essential "in order to effectuate the congressional scheme against rebating and
collusive pricing." 34 It is believed that permitting exceptions to the rates
established by tariff would constitute an open invitation to rebates and other
35
unfair practices.
Section 18(b)(3) of the Shipping Act provides:
No common carrier by water in foreign commerce or conference of
such carriers shall charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or
less or different compensation for the transportation of property or for
any service in connection therewith than the rates and charges which
are specified in its tariffs on file with the Commission and duly published and in effect at the time; nor shall any carrierrebate, refund or remit
in any manner or by any device any portion of the rates or charges so
specified, nor extend or deny to any person
any privilege or facility,
36
except in accordance with such tariffs.
A civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each day the violation continues is
imposed upon "whoever" shall violate this provision." Although the language indicates that the penalty is theoretically applicable to any person
committing a violation, the wording of the substantive offense, which refers
only to carriers, makes it clear that shippers will not be subject to such a
fine.
Another provision of the Shipping Act which deals specifically with
rebates is section 14. Under that section, common carriers are forbidden to
grounds for affirmative relief, but only the attempted enforcement of such a tariff. Port of
Bandon v. Oliver J.Olson & Co., 175 F. Supp. 736, 742 (D. Ore. 1959).
33. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. 245 Packages of Guatambu Squares, More or
Less, 508 F.2d 1116, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1975).

34. United States v. Pan Am. Mail Line, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 728, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
35. Id. at 736. However, the statutory purpose in imposing an obligation upon the carrier to
collect the full freight was to eliminate price discrimination by the carrier and not to create an
absolute liability on the part of the shipper. Therefore, in a case in which the shipper paid the
full amount to a freight forwarder but the forwarder went bankrupt and consequently failed to
pay the carrier, it was held that the statute had been satisfied and the public interest protected

so long as any person was liable for the full amount of the freight. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Titan
Indus. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'dpercuriam,419 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1969),

cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3) (1970) (emphasis added). However, the FMC is authorized to
exercise its discretion to permit a carrier to refund a portion of the charges collected from a

shipper or to waive the collection of a portion of the charges in the event of a clerical or
administrative error, so long as no discrimination among shippers will result. Id.
37. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(6) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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pay or allow, directly or indirectly, a deferred rebate3" to any shipper with
regard to transportation of passengers or property by water between two
United States ports, or between a United States and a foreign port.3 9 Any
carrier violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be subject
to a fine of up to $25,000 for each offense. 40 Again, however, the punishment is, by its terms, specifically applicable to carriers only.
Thus, it would appear that the two provisions of the Shipping Act
addressed specifically to rebates are not applicable to shippers accepting
such rebates. These two sections of the statute deal merely with the civil or
criminal liability of a common carrier who grants or pays a rebate to a
shipper. It could be argued that, by not including a provision in the statute
prohibiting shippers from accepting rebates and by failing expressly to
mention the matter in the legislative history, Congress evidenced an intent to
exempt shippers from liability. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the
Congress simply felt that if rebates were eliminated as a lawful alternative,
powerful shippers controlling a large volume of cargo would be deprived of
any coercive influence that might enable them to demand rebate clauses in
their transportation contracts with carriers. In the event of a violation of the
rebate prohibition, it may have been believed that the shipper's liability was
adequately provided for in other sections of the Shipping Act. 4
It should be noted that the opening section of the Shipping Act 42 is
devoted to a listing of definitions of terms to be used in the interpretation of
the remainder of the statute. The drafters were careful to include statutory
definitions of such crucial terms as "common carrier by water," "common
carrier by water in foreign commerce," and "common carrier by water in
interstate commerce." 43 However, at no point is the term "shipper" either
explained or defined. 44 This omission has prompted courts to rely on the
38. The term "deferred rebate" is defined as

a return of any portion of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a consideration for the giving of all or any portion of its shipments to the same or any other
carrier, or for any other purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the
completion of the service for which it is paid, and is made only if, during both the
period for which computed and the period of deferment, the shipper has complied with
the terms of the rebate agreement or arrangement.
46 U.S.C. § 812 (1970).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See notes 49-81 infra and accompanying text.

42. 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
43. The term "common carrier by water" is said to include both common carriers by water
in foreign commerce and those in interstate commerce. Common carriers by water in foreign
commerce are those engaged in the transportation by water of passengers or property between
the United States and a foreign country, in either the import or export trade. A common carrier
by water in interstate commerce is one engaged in such transportation on the high seas or the
Great Lakes on regular routes between two United States ports. Id.
44. In addition, shippers are not included within the definition of the term "other person
subject to this chapter," which is said to encompass those in the business of forwarding or
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accepted common law meaning in considering whether a particular party
may be properly classified as a shipper. 45 Arguably, the failure to include
"shipper" within the list of defined terms might serve as a general indication that the sanctions of the Shipping Act were not intended to apply to
shippers. But such an argument is far from conclusive, and it might be
asserted with equal force that the drafters simply considered the common
law definition to be adequate. Support for the latter theory is found in the
fact that the courts have also found it necessary to rely on the common law
test in defining "common carrier,"46 although that term is certainly one of
great significance in the application of the Act as a whole. Nonetheless, in
view of the lack of any express prohibition directed toward shippers, one
court has stated that it is doubtful whether shippers were intended to be
subject to the Shipping Act at all.4 7 However, that opinion was written prior
to the enactment of provisions dealing explicitly with violations by shippers 48 and has thus been refuted as a general proposition.
In the entire Shipping Act, there is only one provision which, rather
than simply holding the carrier responsible, imposes liability upon a shipper
who obtains transportation for property at less than the filed tariff rate.
Discriminatory acts by a shipper are prohibited by section 16, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any shipper, . . . or any officer, agent, or
employee thereof, knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, by
means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, false report
of weight, or by any other unjust or unfair device or means to obtain or
attempt to obtain transportationby water for property at less than the
49
rates or charges which would otherwise be applicable.
Any violation of this provision is deemed to be a civil offense carrying a
penalty of as much as $5,000 for each violation.5" Thus, the statute clearly
does contemplate that shippers may be sanctioned for behaving in a way that
is detrimental to the objectives sought to be achieved through the statute. 5 1
furnishing warehouse or other similar terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by
water. Id.
45. See, e.g., Jensen v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 497 F.2d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 1974). See

note 4 supra.
46. See, e.g., Grace Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 280 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961). In that case, the court accepted the common law test which

regarded a carrier as a "common carrier" only when it held itself out as such. 280 F.2d at 792.
47. Prince Line, Ltd. v. American Paper Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053, 1056 (2d Cir. 1932)

(dicta).
48. See, e.g. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

49. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). Common carriers are also
prohibited from allowing any person to obtain transportation for less than the regular rates by
such unfair devices or means. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (Second) (1970).
50. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. V 1975).
51. The Federal Maritime Commission quoted the following statement by Congress as

indicative of the purpose underlying the enactment of § 16 of the Shipping Act:
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The question that must be resolved is whether the acceptance of a
rebate may be seen to constitute a means or device for obtaining transportation at a lower rate than the published tariff, in contravention of section 16.

In Hohenberg Brothers v. FederalMaritime Commission,52 the court held
that since a rebate granted on the basis of false claims is similar in nature to a
"false billing" or a "false classification," 53 such a rebate would constitute
an "unjust or unfair device or means" within the scope of section 16.54 But
not every rebate will be similar in nature to one of the specific offenses
enumerated in the statute. In order to hold the shipper liable in those cases, it
will be necessary to determine that the general proscription against the use

of any unfair device or means for obtaining transportation at less than the
lawful rate prohibits the acceptance of any rebate.

Logic would indicate that a rebate certainly should qualify as such an
unlawful device. As noted above, the tariff, once filed, is said to bind both
the carrier and the shipper with the force of law. 55 Furthermore, the carrier is
expressly prohibited from granting any rebates to shippers. 56 It is well
settled that a primary purpose for enacting the Shipping Act was to achieve
uniformity of treatment among shippers. 57 This goal can be achieved only if
all shippers are required to pay the same rates for transportation of the same
types of property. Because rebates are designed to refund to the shipper a
portion of the established price, their effect is to enable certain shippers to
transport their goods at a price lower than that set in the tariff. Clearly then,
acceptance of a rebate ought to be unlawful if the stated purpose of the
statute is to be effectuated.
[It] provides that it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, .. to allow
the transportation of property at less than the regular rates then in force by the
common carrier by means of false billing or other misclassification of freight, false
claims, etc. Thus it will be seen, that while the carrier is prohibited from allowing
favoritism or partiality as among competing shippers, the carrier itself is afforded no
protection against the practice of an unscrupulous shipper, forwarder, broker, or other
delivering goods to the carrier for transportation in deliberately misclassifying packages of freight for the purpose of obtaining a lower transportation rate at the expense
of the carrier.
The Senate measure, therefore, strengthens this portion of the Shipping Act of
1916, and goes further in providing that such a practice shall neither be engaged in by a
common carrier by water nor by any shipper, . . . thereby effectually removing the
means left open to dishonest shippers or consignees whereby they may take advantage
not only of their competitors who do not indulge in the practice of false billing and
misclassification in order to receive a lower transportation rate for their freight, but
also of the carrier itself by depriving the carrier of a rightful source of revenue.
Carriage of Military Cargo, 1967 Am. Mar. Cas. 443,462 (F.M.C. 1967) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
2205, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1936)).
52. 316 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
53. Id. at 385.
54. Id. at 385 n. 11.
55. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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One of the elements of liability under section 16 is that the action must
be taken knowingly and willfully. 5 If the offense consists of the use of an
unfair device other than those specifically mentioned, the requirement
would appear to be that the shipper must have had knowledge of its legal
duty to pay the charges set in the tariff, and that the shipper willfully
proceeded to use the unfair device in order to obtain transportation at a lower
rate. Since the shipper is deemed to have received constructive notice of the
information contained in a tariff when it is filed by the carrier with the
FMC,5 9 and since the shipper is presumed to know the law as stated in the
Shipping Act, 6° so long as the shipper is cognizant of the probable effect of
the unfair device, the requirement that it act knowingly should present no
real difficulty in holding the shipper liable under section 16. Thus if the
shipper in fact knowingly obtains transportation at a cost lower than the filed
rate, a court may readily find that the shipper intended to do so, and that
therefore the act was willful.
A second requirement of section 16-that the device be "unjust or
unfair"-is not so easily met. There is some authority for the view that not
all rebates fall within the proscription of section 16. In United States v.
Peninsular& Occidental Steamship Co. 6 1 the court held that if no attempt
was made to conceal the rebate and if the rebate was accepted under
circumstances permitting competitors to ascertain that such a procedure had
been followed, the shipper would have committed no offense under section
16.62 Although the court did not furnish detailed analysis, the decision
apparently turned on the phrase "unjust or unfair." While a rebate is
obviously a means by which one shipper might obtain transportation for less
58. See text accompanying note 49 supra. In a case involving false classifications, one
court held that the statute was violated only if the false classification, which was used to obtain
transportation of shipments at unauthorized low rates, was made knowingly and willfully.
Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 304 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
59. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. See Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 157 Misc. 360, 284 N.Y.S. 310 (App. Term 1935) (per curiam) (shipper not
permitted to enforce contract for transportation at less than the rate filed by the carrier, despite

the fact that shipper had no knowledge of the published rates).
60. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
61. 208 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
62. Id. at 958. The matter reached the court on the motion of two defendants to have the
second count of a two-count information dismissed on the grounds that their alleged act did not
constitute an offense. The disputed count is quoted by the court as follows:
On or about the 27th day of October, 1960, in the Southern District of New York,

JOHN H. FAUNCE, INC. and VINCENT WORTMAN, an officer, agent and em-

ployee thereof, defendants, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did obtain and attempt
to obtain transportation by water in foreign commerce for property at less than the
rates and charges which would otherwise be applicable by an unjust and unfair device
and means, to wit, the payment of a rebate of a portion of certain shipping charges by
THE PENINSULAR AND OCCIDENTAL STEAMSHIP COMPANY, a common
carrier by water engaged in foreign commerce, and its agent, MAC GREGOR SHIPPING COMPANY, INC. to JOHN H. FAUNCE, INC.
Id. at 957-58.
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than the price quoted to his competitors, the court believed the rebate should
not be considered unfair if the fact of the rebate is open to public scrutiny; in

such cases, the court felt that market pressures from competing shippers
would be sufficient to alleviate any possible unfairness.6 3 However, it is not

likely that rebates would ever be granted openly since the carrier would find
it necessary to conceal the rebate in some way in order to avoid section 14 or
section 18(b)(3) liability, 64 and this concealment would be sufficient to

establish the shipper's liability under section 16. Thus, a shipper who is
powerful enough to demand rebates from a carrier, thereby disadvantaging

its competitors, is also apt to incur liability for this unfair use of its
bargaining power. Because of this, the Peninsularlimitation would have

65
little effect in most cases.
More importantly, restricting the applicability of section 16 to those
situations where there has been an attempt to conceal the fact of the rebate is

clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the Shipping Act to eliminate
rebating, rate discrimination and collusive pricing, 66 or with the strict

enforcement policy that has been applied to the requirement that the full
63. The court relied heavily on an opinion by Judge Learned Hand construing identical
language contained in the second paragraph of § 16, which forbids carriers to allow any person
to obtain transportation for less than the established rates through the use of such a device.
According to Judge Learned Hand,
[t]he law did not forbid all concessions to a shipper; apparently it assumed that if these
were above board, and known or ascertainable by competitors, the resulting jealousies
and pressure upon the carrier would be corrective enough. But it did forbid the carrier
to grant such favors, when accompanied by any concealment.
Prince Line, Ltd. v. American Paper Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1932), quoted in
208 F.Supp. at 958.
On a motion for reargument, the court in Peninsular considered the situation where a
shipper and a carrier act in conjunction to deceive other shippers through the use of unfair
devices. The court recognized legislative history indicating an intent to protect innocent carriers
from being defrauded by a shipper, but rejected the argument that only the carrier would be
liable. 208 F. Supp. at 958-59. In reaching this decision, the court relied on a house report
stating that the practice of obtaining transportation at a lower rate is forbidden to both the
carrier and the shipper. Competing shippers are protected from dishonest shippers, but this
protection also extends to the carrier itself. Id. at 959 n.1 (citing H.R. Rsp. No. 2205, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936)).
64. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
65. Although the proposition that shippers may be held strictly liable under § 16 for
accepting a rebate appears unexceptionable, one court has refused to accept an interpretation
requiring strict liability. In the Hohenberg Brothers case, the court stated:
Hohenberg has argued that we cannot affirm the Commission unless we hold that
obtaining a lower rate, without more, constitutes a violation of Section 16. We hold no
such thing. Hohenberg's actions in this case went well beyond a mere public request
that it be granted lower rates. We affirm because of the way in which lower rates were
obtained, not because of the mere fact that they were.
316 F.2d at 385. But this need not be interpreted as an absolute rejection of the notion of strict
liability. Because the defendant's actions were found to be the equivalent of false billing, the
element of concealment was present. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to go beyond the
Peninsulardecision in order to include rebates unaccompanied by acts of concealment.
66. See notes 27, 34 supra and accompanying text.
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tariff rate be charged to each shipper. 67 Both of these factors would indicate
that a broader construction of section 16 is more appropriate. The courts
should not have to depend on ordinary market pressures to correct, over a
period of time, the inequalities in effective rates charged to competing
shippers. The "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation does not
necessarily yield the proper result, and, as one court has observed, "Judge
Learned Hand was not preaching novel doctrine when he instructed years
ago: 'There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it
literally."'68 This was thought to be especially true when a literal reading
69
produced an anomalous result.
It should be noted that the Peninsularapproach may make considerable
sense when applied to interstate commerce. The provision of the Shipping
Act governing rates to be charged by carriers in interstate commerce merely
requires that the maximum rate be filed, and that just and reasonable rates be
enforced. These carriers are forbidden to collect a greater compensation for
such transportation services. 70 Apparently, ordinary market pressures were
considered sufficient to insure the equitable treatment of shippers with
respect to transportation in interstate commerce. Because a rebate involves
the collection of a lesser amount than the filed rate, it is only in cases of
attempted concealment that a rebate might be regarded as a violation of the
requirement that rates charged by a carrier be "just."
However, the filing requirement is quite different for carriers engaged
in foreign commerce. The carrier in foreign commerce must file with the
FMC, not a maximum rate, but one single rate to be charged for all
transportation between United States and foreign ports. 71 Section 18(b)(3)
prohibits a carrier in foreign commerce from collecting either more or less
than the rate set forth in the filed tariff for transportation services, and
rebates not included in the rate schedule are expressly forbidden. 72 Thus, in
the context of foreign commerce, there is no indication of a legislative intent
to leave the enforcement of equal treatment for all shippers to the normal
pressures of the market. In view of this difference in the language of the
67. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
68. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 385
U.S. 974 (1966) (quoting Judge Learned Hand, Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.
1944) (concurring opinion), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945)). But
see Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 274,277 (D. Kan. 1967)
(arising under the Interstate Commerce Act) ("[r]ate and tariff items are promulgated for
laymen to use in their ordinary affairs and where the language is plain they should be given their
plain meaning") (footnotes omitted).
69. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 974 (1966).
70. 46 U.S.C. § 817(a) (1970). See note 30 supra.
71. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(1) (1970).
72. Id. § 817(b)(3).
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Shipping Act, a more justifiable approach than that applied in the Peninsular case 73 would be to hold that any shipper in foreign commerce that
accepts a rebate and thereby obtains transportation at a cost less than or
74
different from the published rate is liable under section 16.
Regardless of whether the ambiguity in the statute is resolved in favor
of liability on the part of a shipper who accepts a rebate, a shipper who
induces a carrier to pay a rebate also may be prosecuted as an aider and

abettor in the commission of a crime. 75 The prosecution would be based on a
statute that provides that any person who aids and abets or induces an
offense against the United States is punishable as a principal. 76 Under the
,statute, the common law distinctions between principals and accessories are
eliminated and all parties are made subject to the same liability, regardless
of whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. 77 A person charged
with aiding and abetting will be punishable as a principal if he consciously
shares in a criminal act, even in the absence of an actual conspiracy. 78 In
order to establish the offense, the government is merely required to show
73. In Peninsularthe government had alleged that the defendant had used unjust means to
obtain transportation at less than the rate filed by the carrier with the FMC. However, the court
did not address the differences in the filing requirements imposed upon carriers in foreign as
opposed to interstate commerce. On the motion for reargument, the court indicated that it was
not concerned with any comparison between the treatment accorded to various shippers by the
carrier. Its concern was only with the "disequality between the rates at which defendants
obtained or attempted to obtain transportation, and the rates that 'would otherwise be applicable.'" 208 F. Supp. at 959 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1970)).
74. It should be noted that the Shipping Act does not prevent a shipper from seeking a more
favorable rate. In this regard, he is restricted only by the statute's prohibitions against preference, prejudice and discrimination, and by the requirement that the means employed by the
shipper not be unfair or unjust within the meaning of § 16. Thus, it has been said that the basic
purpose of § 16 is "to insure adherence by a carrier to his publicly announced rates, not to
foreclose any change in those rates at the behest of an individual shipper." Carriage of Military
Cargo, 1967 Am. Mar. Cas. 443, 461 (F.M.C. 1967).
In a senate report containing recommendations relating to water carriers engaged in foreign
trade, it was stated:
It is not the purpose of this recommendation to prevent steamship lines from promptly
lowering their rates to meet competitive conditions and thus to favor American
exporters, who, in competing with foreign markets, often find it necessary in order to
close their contracts to have quoted an immediate and favorable rate; but the purpose
of the law should be to protect the shipper against any unreasonable high rate with
which the combination lines may have within their power, by virtue of their agreements and conference arrangements, arbitrarily to impose in the absence of Government supervision and control.
S. REP. No. 689, supra note 27, at 10. Thus, it is not expected that the tariff rate will never be
changed. The statute is merely intended to prohibit certain favored shippers from paying a
lower rate while the tariff rate ostensibly remains in effect. Carriage of Military Cargo, 1967
Am. Mar. Cas. 443, 462 F.M.C. 1967). Clearly, if the filed rate is changed in accordance with
proper procedures, 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(2) (1970), then a shipper who pays the new lower rate has
not violated any provision of the Shipping Act.
75. See Peninsular,208 F. Supp. at 958-59.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). This section provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
77. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1973).
78. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954); United States v. Valencia, 492 F.2d
1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1974).
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some affirmative participation by the person charged which at least served to
79
encourage the perpetrator.
Naturally, in order for the shipper to be exposed to such liability, the
carrier would have to have committed a criminal offense. A violation of
section 14 of the Shipping Act 80 is a criminal misdemeanor, and thus could
subject both the carrier and shipper to liability. However, the offense
described in section 18(b)(3) 8 1 merely subjects the carrier to civil liability.
Therefore, the aiding and abetting statute would not be applicable in cases
arising under that provision.
I.

POSSIBLE RESOLUTION OF THE AMBIGUITY BY THE FMC

It is conceivable that the FMC could resolve the ambiguity in the
statute with regard to a shipper's liability for the acceptance of a rebate
through the exercise of its authority to establish and enforce regulations. The
FMC is empowered by the Shipping Act to make such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the other provisions of the statute.8 2 Such
an express delegation of rulemaking power should be construed to grant the
agency the authority to establish regulations and substantive rules that are
reasonable in light of the purposes of the enabling legislation., 3 Thus, it
appears that the FMC could resolve the issue of a shipper's liability by
promulgating a regulation holding the acceptance of a rebate by a shipper
that enables it to obtain transportation for less than is provided in the tariff to
be a violation of section 16. A substantive regulation of this type would be
consistent with the purposes of the Shipping Act in that it would promote
uniformity in the treatment of both carriers and shippers, prevent discrimination and discourage rebating. 84 In addition, such a regulation would be
79. United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Thomas,
469 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973).
80. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.

81. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
82. 46 U.S.C. § 841a (1970).
83. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 56, at 149 (1976); see Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
Statutory language almost identical to the enabling provision of the Shipping Act has been
construed to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate substantive rules. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.

951 (1974). The court was construing section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act which
provides that the FTC "shall also have power

purpose of carrying out the provisions.

. . of this

. . .

to make rules and regulations for the

title." 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

Authority to issue such rules is consistent with the broad legislative purposes underlying
the establishment of regulatory commissions. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra at § 56, at 150. The

exercise of that rulemaking power represents an appropriate means of effectuating those goals
because it would enable the commissions to function more efficiently and would serve to bring

about more uniform results in particular cases. Id.
84. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
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reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation; the statutory
language is simply too ambiguous to provide effective enforcement. A
regulation such as this which does not exceed the authority of the agency's
generic statute assumes the force of law, and would be applied by the courts
85
as if it were a part of the statute under which it issues.
As an alternative to issuing a substantive regulation, the FMC could
promulgate an interpretative rule 86 clarifying the applicability of section 16

to rebates. The Commission would be acting within its authority in defining
the term "unfair device" to include the acceptance of a rebate that enables a
shipper to obtain transportation for less than the filed rate, regardless of the
presence or absence of an act of concealment. Such a clarification is
arguably necessary in order to insure the uniform application of the provision.
In addition to its rulemaking power, the Commission is authorized to
investigate alleged violations of the Shipping Act and to issue appropriate
orders regarding any practice requiring FMC approval. 87 The FMC possesses primary jurisdiction over persons subject to the Shipping Act and is

responsible for obtaining and enforcing compliance with its provisions.88 In
this capacity, the Commission's function is to interpret and apply existing

statutory provisions, rather than to promulgate new regulations. Deference
will be paid to agency decisions involving matters within the agency's
special expertise. 89 This is particularly true where, as in the case of the
FMC, the interests of foreigners are affected 9° and there is thus a greater
85. Pacific Coast European Conf. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 376 F.2d 785, 790 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
86. A distinction may be drawn between substantive and interpretative rules. Substantive
regulations are promulgated pursuant to statutory authority and carry the same force and legal
effect as a statute. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at § 59. An interpretative regulation, on the
other hand, is merely a clarification of existing laws or regulations in the form of a statement of
the construction adopted by the agency. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C.
Cir. 1952). Unlike a substantive regulation, an interpretative rule does not assume the force of
law. However, interpretative rules are of tremendous practical significance due to the great
weight attached to them by the courts. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at § 58. Interpretative
rules, "while not controlling on the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
87. 46 U.S.C. § 821 (1970); Pacific Coast European Conf. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
537 F.2d 333, 337 (9th Cir. 1976).
88. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. New York Terminal Conf., 262 F. Supp. 225, 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 424 (1967).

89. American Union Transp., Inc. v. United States, 257 F.2d 607, 612 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1958) (distinguishing the services of a broker from a freight forwarder).
90. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 336 F.2d 650, 663 & n.23 (9th Cir.
1964), rev'd on othergrounds, 383 U.S. 213 (1966) (citing D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING
CARTELS: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL REGULATION BY SHIPPING CONFERENCES 137 (1953)).
Through the Shipping Act, the FMC is able to regulate foreign carriers which operate on routes
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than usual need for consistency and uniformity of interpretation. As one
court observed:
Congress, in setting up this elaborate system of controlled cooperation
in respect to rates, shipping conditions, and other matters relating to
carriers in foreign trade, and committing its regulation and enforcement
to a special commission, contemplated that this commission would
become familiar with the problems of foreign water-borne commerce
and develop considerable expertise in connection therewith.
requires more than
The Act lists many standards whose application
91
ordinary familiarity with ocean transportation.
For these reasons, the principle is now well established that an initial
submission to the federal agency will be required in cases raising issues of
fact which demand an understanding of a specialized subject matter beyond
the conventional experience of judges, and in cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion. 92 In order to achieve more uniform and consistent
regulation of the industry, preliminary resort to the agency for a determination of the facts is necessary even in those situations where the facts will
93
later serve as a basis for a judicial determination of legal consequences.
Despite this, one court has ruled that a violation of that portion of
section 18(b)(3) which forbids a carrier to accept a lesser price than the tariff
rate, is not a matter requiring the special expertise of the FMC. 94 It was the
defendant's contention in that case that in deference to the Commission's
expertise in the field of tariff interpretation and administration the court
should refrain from taking further action until proceedings could be instituted before the FMC.9 s This argument was rejected, and it was held that
preliminary resort to the FMC was not required. 96 It was noted that administrative proceedings 97 are not a prerequisite to a civil action by the United
States under section 18(b)(6) 98 to recover penalties for certain Shipping Act
between the United States and foreign countries to a certain degree. Carnation,336 F.2d at 663.
See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 813 (1970).
91. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 336 F.2d 650, 661 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 383 U.S. 213 (1966) (footnote omitted) (deciding what agreements will, or will
not, operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States).
92. Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 575-76 (1952). See also United States V.
Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939); United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S.
474, 481, 485-88 (1932).
93. Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
94. United States v. Pan Am. Mail Line, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 728, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
95. Id. at731.
96. Id. at 732.
97. Section 22 provides for complaints to the FMC and authorizes the Commission to
institute investigations on its own initiative and to award reparations if the violations are
established. 46 U.S.C. § 821 (1970). Section 23 requires a full hearing prior to any orders by the
FMC with respect to violations. Id. § 822. See United States v. Pan Am. Mail Line, Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 728, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
98. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(6) (1970).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1978:224

violations. 99 Because the case merely involved the question of whether an
amount different from the filed tariff had been collected by the carrier, it
was held that the case involved no technical language requiring expert
construction, no complicated facts requiring expert analysis and no need for

uniform decisional law. 100 Thus, the court believed the issue could appropriately be decided in the judicial proceeding.

Even if the mechanical application of the specific statutory language
that is required in cases involving section 18(b)(3) may be regarded as
sufficient to give the courts and the FMC concurrent jurisdiction, 10 1 considerations of subject matter expertise and uniformity still point to the
regulatory agency as the preferable forum. If section 18(b)(3) determina-

tions do not involve the FMC's special expertise, it is clear that section 16
determinations do. A shipper's liability under section 16 is dependent upon
the interpretation to be given to the term "unfair device." The Commission's expertise in the field of international shipping would render that body
much more qualified to determine whether the effects of a particular type of
rebate are likely to result in the unfair treatment of competing shippers.1 02
Nonetheless, it might be argued that the issue of shipper liability is one

which should not be left to resolution by the FMC. In Alcoa Steamship Co.
v. Federal Maritime Commission,103 the court reviewed the legislative

history of the Shipping Act and found that Congress intended for the FMC to
possess fewer investigatory and regulatory powers than those found in other
federal agencies regulating commerce. This was believed to be necessary

because maritime carriers differ from domestic railroads in that they are in
direct competition with foreign carriers. Congress was concerned with the
possibility that American carriers might be placed in a disadvantageous
position in relation to their foreign competitors if the shipping industry were
to become over-regulated. While the Alcoa Steamship case concerned the
99. United States v. Pan Am. Mail Line, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 728, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
100. Id.
101. See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction,77 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1964).
102. The standard used by courts in reviewing agency decision lends further support to the
view that these matters are appropriate for an initial agency determination. Under § 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court may set aside an agency's findings and
conclusions if they are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported
by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S.
607, 619 (1966). According to the Supreme Court, Congress had several definite motives in
adopting this standard of review: the reviewing courts were to be relieved of the time consuming task of weighing the evidence, the expertise of the administrative tribunal would be given
effect, and uniformity of interpretation would be promoted. Id. at 620-21.
103. 348 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1965). That case dealt with a procedural matter, i.e., the power
of the FMC to inspect business records. Such power was expressly conferred on the ICC but
not mentioned with regard to the FMC by the Shipping Act. According to Chief Judge Bazelon,
"[w]here Congress has consistently made express its delegation of a particular power, its
silence is strong evidence that it did not intend to grant the power." Id. at 758.
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procedural authority of the FMC, the court would also impose limits on the
Commission's substantive powers. According to the court, the FMC is
empowered to adopt only those rules necessary for the substantive regulation required by the Shipping Act, and this power is not to be exercised in
such a manner as to place an unequal burden on United States carriers in
relation to their foreign competitors. 104
Despite the court's concern, a clarification of the applicability of
section 16 to rebates does not appear to pose any danger to the delicate
competitive balance in the international shipping industry. The susceptibility of American shippers to regulation by the FMC has already been established. A clarification of the meaning of section 16 would merely serve to
enhance the uniform application of the statute. Domestic carriers are prohibited from allowing such rebates by several provisions of the Shipping
Act.105 The prohibitions are also applicable to foreign carriers. Under
section 14a, a foreign carrier may be refused the right of entry into any
United States port until the violation ceases.1t 6 The FMC is granted the
authority to determine whether a foreign carrier has violated the statute's
prohibition against the granting of deferred rebates. 107
While the FMC would appear to be the most appropriate body to
ascertain the proper application of section 16 to shippers' receipt of rebates,
it has not yet exercised its rulemaking power to set forth guidelines to be
used in determining the applicability of this particular provision. Instead, it
has sought to achieve the desired uniformity of treatment for shippers
through the use of settlement agreements, under which shippers have volun08
tarily agreed to pay fines.1
Although the resolution of the ambiguity in section 16 by the FMC,
either by regulation or by order, is both logical and supported by ample
authority, one court has held that the Commission lacks authority to regulate
the conduct proscribed in section 16. United States v. American Union
Transport,Inc. 109 involved alleged violations by a carrier of that portion of
section 16 that makes it a misdemeanor for a carrier to allow any person to
obtain transportation at less than the regular rate by any unfair device. n 0
104. Id. at 759-62. The Shipping Act contains an express prohibition addressed to common
carriers by water in foreign commerce against the collection of any rate which is unjustly
prejudicial to exporters of the United States as compared with their foreign competitors. 46
U.S.C. § 816 (1970).
105. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
106. 46 U.S.C. § 813 (1970).
107. Id.
108. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
109. 232 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1964).
110. The court quoted the statutory language of 46 U.S.C. § 815 as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water.
tion with any other person, directly or indirectly-

. . either

alone or in conjunc-
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Although the court recognized the FMC's power to determine the rea-

sonableness of rates charged by carriers,"' it felt that section 16 merely
addressed itself to prohibiting evasions of the established rates. Because

such conduct is specifically prohibited by the statute, the court believed
there was no need for special expertise, and the FMC was seen to possess no
authority to regulate in this area. 112 Apparently, this conclusion was founded
upon the court's observation that the Shipping Act contains no explicit grant
of power to the FMC that would enable the agency to determine whether a
violation of section 16 has occured.11 3 However, such a conclusion is
inconsistent with the court's earlier citation to several provisions of the
Shipping Act that empower the FMC to investigate any violation of the
statute-including section 16-and to issue an order to remedy any violation
1 14
found to exist after a hearing.

The validity of the American Union Transportdecision and its applicability to that part of section 16 which provides that a shipper may not obtain
transportation at less than the tariff rate by any unfair device is subject to
serious question.115 The major issue in the case was whether the FMC has
exclusive jurisdiction over section 16 violations. Thus, once the court

determined that it at least had concurrent jurisdiction with the agency, its
Second, to allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the
regular rates or charges then established and enforced on the line of such carrier by
means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, false report of weight, or by
other unjust or unfair device or means.
Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 for each offense.
232 F. Supp. at 701. The section quoted by the court was amended in 1972, Act of Aug. 29,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-416, 86 Stat. 653 (1972) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. V 1975)), and
the provision was changed to provide for a civil remedy.
The current § 16 imposes criminal sanctions upon carriers granting unreasonable preference to any particular person or locality, or inducing an insurance company not to give a
competing carrier as favorable a rate of insurance. A corresponding civil penalty is applied to
both shippers and carriers engaging in the use of unfair devices to enable a shipper to obtain
transportation at less than the lawful rate. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. V 1975).
11I. Sections 17 and 18 authorize the FMC to determine the reasonableness of a carrier's
rates and practices, and to prescribe reasonable and just rates and regulations. 46 U.S.C. §§
816, 817 (1970).
112. 232 F. Supp. at 703. Compare with United States v. Pan Am. Mail Line, Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See notes 94-102 supra and accompanying text.
113. 232 F. Supp. at 703. The court compared § 14a under which the FMC is expressly
authorized to determine the existence of a violation of § 14, to the absence of any such express
enabling provision with respect to § 16. Id.
114. Id. at 702. See 46 U.S.C. 88 821-829 (1970).
115. A separate violation of § 16 was charged against the shipper for using false measurements and false billing to obtain transportation at less than the rate otherwise applicable.
However, the court's decision deals merely with the carrier's motion for dismissal of the
information on the ground that the FMC had exclusive, primary jurisdiction. 232 F. Supp. at
701.
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further statements concerning the Commission's powers became dicta.
Moreover, there is a clear indication that its dicta was overly broad.
The carrier in the case argued that its conduct in knowingly accepting
false measurements supplied by the shipper was not specifically prohibited
by section 16 and that if such behavior is to constitute an offense under that
provision, it would have to fall within the purview of the general prohibition
against the use of "any other unjust or unfair device or means" to obtain
transportation at less than the established rate.' 16 It was the carrier's contention that the special expertise of the FMC should be consulted in order to
determine whether the general language of section 16 should be applied to
this particular offense. 117 This theory was rejected by the court on the
ground that the proper interpretation of the statute's intent presented only a
question of law. The court believed itself to be as capable as the FMC to
determine the meaning and intent of the statute. 118 But even if the court is
correct in this matter, it is not clear that its reasoning should be extended to
cover the application of section 16 to rebates.
The false measurements with which the court was concerned are
essentially equivalent to false billing, which is specifically prohibited by the
statute. Thus, even if the court is competent to make this comparison and
determine that false measurements are "unfair devices," it still may not be
equally competent to determine whether a rebate should similarly fall within
that category. Rebates have no analogue in the statute's list of specifically
enumerated offenses; the special expertise of the FMC is required to gauge
the effects of the practice on competing shippers in foreign commerce. The,
dicta of American Union Transportshould not be seen to preempt the FMC
from assuming jurisdiction to act, either by rule or order, to clarify the
existing ambiguity in section 16. Even if the courts are not willing to defer
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, the principle of concurrent
jurisdiction should be recognized. In view of the FMC's specialized expertise, the wisdom of any decision that would deny the agency a role in the
interpretation of the Shipping Act is questionable.
IV.

COMPARISON WrTH

E INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT

The Shipping Act was passed by Congress with the intent that it would
parallel in its own field the regulation of commerce provided under the
Interstate Commerce Act. 119 It was expected that the comprehensive Ship116. Id. at 704.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 49 U.S.C. § § 1-27, 301-327, 901-1022, 1231-1240 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see Ambler v.
Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills, 68 F.2d 268, 269 (9th Cir. 1933). The senate report accompanying the enactment of the Shipping Act observed:
While the part of the bill relating to the regulation of carriers by water differs
necessarily and materially from the corresponding provisions of the interstate
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ping Act would stand in the same position with respect to common carriers
by water as that held by the Interstate Commerce Act in relation to interstate
carriers by land. Because the Interstate Commerce Act had already been in
effect for a substantial period of time, the application of its provisions to a
wide variety of situations had been the subject of numerous judicial opinions. 120 In view of the similarities between the two statutes, the Supreme
Court observed:
In its general scope and purpose, as well as in its terms, that act [the
Shipping Act] closely parallels the Interstate Commerce Act; and we
cannot escape the conclusion that Congress intended that the two acts,
each in its own field, should have like interpretation, application, and
effect. It follows that the settled construction in respect of the earlier
act must be applied to the later one, unless, in particular instances,
there be something peculiar in the question under consideration, or
dissimilarity in the
terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a differ2
ent conclusion.' '
Thus, it is only in those instances where the unique problems of transportation by water require specialized treatment that the traditional concepts
commerce act, the difference is not so radical that the administration and enforcement
provisions of the latter act and the nearly 30 years' experience of the Interstate
Commerce Commission cannot be adapted with slight modifications to the purposes of
this bill.
S. REP. No. 689, supra note 27, at 12. The Interstate Commerce Act is applicable to common
carriers engaged in the "transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly
by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or
arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment" from one state to another or from the
United States to or from a foreign country, but only insofar as such transportation takes place
within the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1970). It is not applicable to transportation wholly
within one state. Id. § 1(2).
120. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966); United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932). In Consolo, the Court held that if the
Interstate Commerce Act allowed a shipper to bring a direct review proceeding to challenge the
adequacy of a reparation award granted by the ICC, then a similar action should be permitted to
challenge an award issued by the FMC, subject only to any special provisions applicable to
maritime cases. Id. at 613. Another court observed that the Interstate Commerce Act allowed
carriers the right to recover the full transportation charges specified in the approved tariff,
despite an agreement to transport the cargo at a lesser rate. Maritime Serv. Corp. v. Sweet
Brokerage De Puerto Rico, Inc., 537 F.2d 560, 562 (lst Cir. 1976). This right to recover had been
inferred from an express requirement that the carrier charge only the established rate, and from
the congressional policy against unjust discrimination. Because a similar congressional policy
against discriminatory rates is found in the Shipping Act's requirement that carriers enforce the
filed tariff, it was held that the same inferences should be drawn to give the carrier a right to
recover under the Shipping Act. Id. at 562-63. See also Prince Line, Ltd. v. American Paper
Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1932).
121. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 481 (1932). The Court
then proceeded to review various provisions of the Shipping Act, and concluded that their close
parallelism with the Interstate Commerce Act justified the application to both Acts of similar
principles of construction and administration. Id. at 484.
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governing domestic common carriers will not be regarded as applicable to
international commerce by water. 122
The similarities between section 16 of the Shipping Act and section
6(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act 123 were noted in Prince Line, Ltd. v.
American Paper Exports, Inc.124 The court acknowledged the numerous
judicial opinions construing this provision of the Interstate Commerce Act
which have held: first, that the rate filed by the carrier is the only lawful
charge,",- second, that deviation from the lawful charge is not to be allowed
under any pretext, 126 third, that the carrier will not be permitted to reduce
the amount payable by contract, 127 fourth, that the carrier will not be
precluded by his own act or omission from enforcing payment of the full
amount,128 and finally, that because the tariff embodies the congressional
policy of preventing unjust discrimination, the rate will be enforced even in
cases where it works a hardship. 129 In view of the similarly explicit expression of legislative intent behind the Shipping Act, that the established rate
should be the legal rate that the carrier is required to charge and the shipper
is required to pay, each of these considerations was seen to apply with equal
force to section 16.130
The PrinceLine case dealt with that portion of section 16 that makes it
unlawful for a carrier to allow any person to obtain transportation at less
than the regular established rate by any unfair device or means. 13 1 These
same considerations would appear to be applicable to that part of the
provision that prohibits a shipper from obtaining transportation for less than
the published rate through the use of an unfair device. 132 However, in
Hohenberg Brothers, which considered an alleged offense by a shipper
under that provision, the court refused to entertain a comparison to the
122. United States v. Stephen Bros. Line, 384 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1967).
123. 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1970). Section 6(7) provides:

No carrier . . . shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or

nor shall the
property. . . unless thd rates. . . have been filed and published ...
carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensa-

tion for such transportation of passengers or property

. . .;

nor shall any carrier

refund or remit in any manner or by any device any portion of the rates, fares and

charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any privileges or facilities in
the transportation of passengers or property except such as are specified in such
tariffs.
124. 45 F.2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), aff'd, 55 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1932).
125. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 581 (1919); Lousiville & N.R.R.
v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
126. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
127. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 65 (1924); New York
Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 406, 408 (1921).
128. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 65 (1924).
129. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
130. 45 F.2d at 242-43.
131. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (Second) (1970).
132. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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corresponding provision in the Interstate Commerce Act. 133 The court stated

in a footnote that "[a]ppellants reliance upon cases construing Section 10(3)
of the Interstate Commerce Act. . . is misplaced. The statutory language,
the legislative history, and the statutory context are quite different." 134 But
an examination of the statutory language, legislative history and statutory
context would indicate that the court was incorrect in this instance.
Section 10(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits the use of any
135
device to obtain transportation at less than the regular established rates.
The statutory language is almost identical to that found in section 16 of the
Shipping Act.136 It is true that the Interstate Commerce Act contains an
additional provision that specifically prohibits the acceptance of rebates by
persons utilizing the transportation services of the carrier. 13 7 But the absence
of a similar provision in the Shipping Act should present no obstacle to the

application of the principle that similar provisions in the two statutes should
be construed in a like manner. Uniform judicial construction of the Shipping
Act indicates that, albeit subject to possible limitations, a shipper may be
held liable under section 16 for accepting a rebate for the purpose of
obtaining transportation at a rate lower than that set forth in the applicable
tariff. 138 Thus, the courts have developed a body of judicial law that renders
133. 49 U.S.C. § 10(3) (i970). See note 135 infra.
134. 316 F.2d at 385 n.10. The court provided no elaboration of this conclusbry statement.
135. 49 U.S.C. § 10(3) (1970). Section 10(3) provides:
Any person .. who shall deliver property for transportation to any common carrier
• . . who shall knowingly and willfully, directly, or indirectly. . . by false billing...
or by any other device or means, whether with or without the consent or connivance of
the carrier . . . obtain or attempt to obtain transportation for such property at less
than the regular rates then established . . . shall be deemed guilty of fraud, which is
declared to be a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction . . . be subject for each
offense to a fine of not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment . . . not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
136. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
137. 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1970). Section 41(1) provides:
'[I]t shall be unlawful for any person. . to offer, grant, or give, or to solicit, accept,
or receive any rebate. . . in respect to the transportation of any property in interstate
or foreign commerce by any common carrier. . . whereby any such property shall be
any device whatever be transported at a less rate than that named in the tariffs
published and filed by such carrier. . . or whereby any other advantage is given or
discrimination is practiced. Every person or corporation, whether carrier or shipper,
who shall, knowingly, offer, grant, or give, or solicit, accept, or receive any such
rebates. . . shall be deemed guilty of'a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall
be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $20,000.
In addition, the shipper who accepts a rebate may be fined in the amount of three times the
amount of the rebate received. According to § 41(3):
Any person . . . who shall deliver property for interstate transportation to any
common carrier.

. .

who shall knowingly

.

. . directly or indirectly.

. .

receive or

accept from such common carrier any sum of money or any other valuable consideration as a rebate or offset against the regular charges for transportation of such
property . . . shall in addition to any penalty provided by said sections forfeit to the
United States a sum of money three times the amount of money so received or
accepted and three times the value of any other consideration so received or accepted.
Id. § 41(3).
138. See, for example, the Hohenberg Brothers and Peninsularcases, discussed in notes 5274 supra and accompanying text.
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section 16 of the Shipping Act an approximate equivalent of section 1(1) of
139
the Elkins Act.
It is well established that one of the primary purposes underlying the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act was to provide for the uniform
treatment of all users of transportation services and to eliminate discriminatory practices of all types. 140 This aim, which corresponds to the primary
purpose of the Shipping Act, 141 has been recognized by numerous courts. 142

Prior to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, railroad traffic had
been governed by the principles of common law which merely required that
common carriers transport the property of all persons who applied and that
the rates for such transportation be reasonable. Although the weight of
authority favored equal charges for all persons obtaining similar services,

there was some doubt under the common law as to whether carriers were
required to establish uniform rates to be charged to all users for the same
service. 143 It was the possibility of discrimination resulting from this ambi139. 49 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
140. Howitt v. United States, 328 U.S. 189, 192 (1946). As the Supreme Court observed:
'Discriminatory rates are but one form of trade barriers.' Their effect is not only to impede
established industries but to prevent the establishment of new ones, to arrest the development
of a State or region, to make it difficult for an agricultural economy to evolve into an industrial
one." New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 308 (1947) (citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945)).
In construing the statutes, the courts are instructed to consider the legislative history, and
out of different possible constructions, [to] select and apply the one that best comports
with the genius of our institutions and, therefore, most likely to have been the
construction intended by the law-making power. Commerce, in its largest sense, must
be deemed to be one of the most important subjects of legislation, and an intention to
promote and facilitate it, and not to hamper or destroy it, is naturally to be attributed
to Congress.
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 218-19 (1896). Both the ICC and the courts are
reminded to look to all of the pertinent circumstances and to consider the legitimate interests of
the carriers as well as those of the shippers. Id. at 218. It should dlso be remembered that it is
not the relation of the carriers to one another which is important, but their relation with those
who use their transportation services. It is the patrons who are entitled to uniform treatment by
the carriers. ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 225 U.S. 326, 342 (1912).
141. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 296 (1947) ("[t]he principal evil at
which the Interstate Commerce Act was aimed was discrimination in its various manifestations"); Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S.-450, 463 (1941) ("there has been a welldefined and continuous purpose to eliminate preferences to shippers from our system of
transportation for reasons of fairness and to avoid rate wars, detrimental to the efficiency of the
carriers"); ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 276 (1892) ("[t]he principal objects of the
Interstate Commerce Act were to secure just and reasonable charges for transportation; to
prohibit unjust discriminations in the rendition of like services under similar circumstances and
conditions; to prevent undue or unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations or localities;
to inhibit greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line; and
to abolish combinations for the pooling of freights"); Farley Terminal Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 522 F.2d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975) ("[i]t is well
recognized that the principal congressional purpose in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act
was to obtain a uniformity of rates and an end to discriminatory practices").
143. ICC v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 275 (1892).
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guity that the Interstate Commerce Act was designed to eliminate. With
regard to the specific issue of rebates, one court has observed that the

congressional intent behind the Interstate Commerce Act's tariff provisions
was specifically to prevent rebates and to require that all shipments be made
at the same rate. 144 A similar purpose is perceived as underlying the
enactment of the Shipping Act. 145
In giving effect to the perceived intent behind the statute, courts have

applied a policy of strict enforcement to the requirement under section 6(7)
of the Interstate Commerce Act that no rate differing from the filed tariff
shall be charged by a carrier. 146 In addition, patrons have been required to
pay the full tariff charge regardless of initial misquotations or miscalcula-

tions of charges by the carrier. While the possibility of harsh results in
individual cases is recognized, it is believed that the strict construction is
144. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D.
Okla. 1969). That court would allow the parties to stipulate as to who should pay the charge, so
long as the same rate was charged to all. Id.
There is ample support for the notion that the major purpose of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §
§ 41-67 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), is to eliminate rebates and other such concessions and
discriminations in order to allow all persons to obtain transportation for their property on an
equal basis. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 461 (1941). However, it is not
possible to rely on decisions construing the Elkins Act in order to determine the applicability of
§ 16 of the Shipping Act to various categories of rebates because the shipping Act contains only
those provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act that deal specifically with the question of
rebates. See note 137 supra and accompanying text. Under § I of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41
(1970), the substance of the offense is the solicitation or receipt of the concession, rather than
the device by which it is effected. United States v. Satuloff Bros., 79 F.2d 846, 849 (2d Cir.
1935). Thus, it is quite clear that the concession may be either secret or open, fraudulent or
honest. Id. at 849-50 (citing Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 F. 1, 16 (1907), aff'd, 209
U.S. 56 (1908)). But the substance of the shipper's offense under § 10(3) of the Interstate
Commerce Act is the fraudulent device. 79 F.2d at 849. Thus, it will be necessary to rely upon
judicial opinions interpreting that provision in order to determine whether an element of
concealment or intent is required for a violation of §16 of the Shipping Act to exist.
145. See notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
146. Southern Pac. Co. v. Miller Abattoir Co., 454 F.2d 357,359 (3d Cir. 1972). Because the
carrier is said to have a duty as well as a right to enforce payment of the full tariff charges,
contracts to provide transportation for less are rendered void and will not prevent the carrier
from recovering the full amount. Id. at 359. Thus, the parties are not free to enter into special
contracts or agreements in order to evade the uniformity of treatment of all shippers required
under the Interstate Commerce Act. Cooper v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 217 F.2d 683, 685
(8th Cir. 1954). According to the Supreme Court, the congressional intent to prevent discrimination may not be frustrated by contracts, even in those situations where the contract was
executed prior to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act. United States v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 333 U.S. 169, 175 (1948). Therefore, in any case in which a charge differing from the
published tariff rate is collected, either the carrier or the shipper will have a cause of action to
collect the difference between the amount and the lawful rate. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. v.
Judson Freight Forwarding Co., 49 F. Supp. 789, 795 (S.D. Cal. 1943), aff'd sub nom. National
Carloading Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,150 F.2d 210 (1945). A similar policy of enforcement under the Shipping Act is found with regard to the requirement that the full tariff rate be
charged in every case. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
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necessary if the desired goals of uniform treatment of shippers and prevention of discrimination and favoritism by carriers are to be achieved. 147 The
question of whether a rebate is voluntary or involuntary is considered
irrelevant. Both are seen to be prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act. 148
Once a tariff, rate or charge has been duly established in accordance with the
Act, it becomes the legal rate and binds both the carrier and the shipper with
the force of law.149 All persons are charged with notice of the legal tariff
rates. 150 Consequently, the shipper's knowledge of the lawful rate is presumed.151 This construction has been applied both to section 6, which
prohibits a carrier from deviating from the published rate, 152 and to section
10(3), under which shippers are forbidden to obtain transportation for less
than the legally established rates. 153 To determine whether there has been a
violation courts will look only to the results, not to the intent of the parties.
"Any and all means to accomplish the prohibited end are banned. . . . In
fact favoritism which destroys equality between shippers, however brought
about, is not tolerated.'- 4
There are statutory exceptions to the application of this strict liability,
but they are based on the nature of the rebate rather than the state of mind of
the parties. Only those discriminations or preferences that are unjust or
unreasonable are prohibited. The Interstate Commerce Act "was not intended to ignore the principle that one can sell at wholesale cheaper than at
retail." 155 The payment of damages by a carrier to a shipper has also been
held not to constitute an illegal rebate under the Interstate Commerce Act.
An offense is committed only in those situations involving an overpayment
of damages. 156 Similarly, no violation exists if the carrier reimburses the
147. Southern Pac. Co. v. Miller Abattoir Co., 454 F.2d 357, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1972).
148. Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478, 485 (1939).

149. Farley Terminal Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 522 F.2d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975).

150. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Miller Floors, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 869, 870 (D. Okla. 1968).
151. Farley Terminal Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 522 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975).
152. Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516, 520 (1939). See note
123 supra.
153. Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1939). See note 135 supra.
154. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 462 (1941).
155. ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 276 (1892).
A similar concept is recognized under the Shipping Act. The FMC is required to allow the use

of dual rate contracts that are to be made available to all shippers on equal terms and conditions
whereby lower rates are granted to a shipper who agrees to give all or any fixed portion of his

business to a particular carrier or conference of carriers. 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1970). However, the
FMC need not approve such contracts if they are found to be detrimental to the commerce of
the United States, contrary to the public interest, or unjustly discriminatory between shippers

or between United States exporters and their foreign competitors. Id.
156. Southern Pac. Co. v. Miller Abattoir Co., 454 F.2d 357, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1972). In the

opinion of the court, the mere fact that an unscrupulous railroad might attempt to evade the
laws forbidding rebates through the submission of false claims for damages was not sufficient
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shipper for the performance of services which the carrier was contractually
157
obligated to perform.
The requirement stated in Peninsular that an act of attempted concealment be present in order for a rebate to be considered a violation of
section 16 of the Shipping Act, 158 does not resemble these exceptions to the
rule of strict liability. In the examples above, the rebates were found not to
be discriminatory because they were lawfully accessible to all shippers on an
equal basis. The concealment requirement of Peninsular,on the other hand,
does not address the uniform availability of the rebate, but looks merely to
the question of whether the fact of the rebate was ascertainable by the
recipient's competitors. However, the mere fact that competing shippers
may be-aware of the carrier's rebating procedure with respect to a particular
shipper may not be sufficient to insure uniform treatment. The desired
uniformity of treatment for shippers is obstructed in every situation where
one shipper obtains transportation at a lesser rate than the tariff filed with the
FMC and charged to his competitors. Thus, uniformity will be achieved
only if a construction imposing strict liability for the receipt of a rebate is
given to section 16 of the Shipping Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of an examination of the legislative intent underlying the
enactment of the Shipping Act, a reading of the statutory scheme in its
entirety and a comparison with analogous provisions under the Interstate
Commerce Act, it seems quite clear that any ambiguity inherent in section
16 of the Shipping Act should be resolved in favor of an extension of
liability to shippers receiving illegal rebates. Not only is this conclusion
supported by logic, but it represents the solution favored by principles of
equity. The granting of a rebate by a common carrier is specifically prohibited by law, and consequently, no carrier will be willing to risk incurring
the civil penalty which the offense carries without some expectation of
profit. Two parties-a shipper and a carrier-are necessary to the commission of the offense. It seems highly unlikely that a carrier would violate the
statute in the absence of some sort of encouragement by a shipper. Thus, the
most logical way to obtain-the desired uniformity of treatment for shippers
and to facilitate enforcement of the statute's anti-rebate provisions would be
to remove any incentive for the shipper to request rebates. As one court
observed:
to require the denial of damage awards to those customers presenting legitimate complaints
based upon a breach of duty by the railroad. Id. at 361.
157. Hanna Furnace Corp. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 341, 343 (W.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
323 U.S. 667 (1944).

158. 208 F. Supp. at 958-59. See notes 61-74 supra and accompanying text.
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251

The power in the United States and in the Commission to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Act must carry with it the power to make
such enforcement effective. Here, enforcement can be made effective
only if relief is granted against the noncarrier defendants who are
causing the carriers to violate the act. 5 9
It appears that the prohibition against the use of rebating procedures will
become effective only when shippers as well as carriers are subjected to
liability for engaging in such activity. Congress, the FMC and the courts all
possess the authority to resolve the ambiguity in this manner.
159. United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1963) (relating to charges of
race discrimination).

